In my last brief, I introduced Michael Tooley's argument against fetal and infant personhood, based in part upon the argument that the concept of an immaterial soul is unsound. In this essay, I set forth Aquinas’s account of why the rational soul must be immaterial.
In February 2012, the Journal of Medical Ethics (JME) published a scholarly article defending infanticide (“after-birth abortion”). It stirred considerable controversy. The authors, Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva (GM), argued as follows: a fetus is not an actual person but a potential person...
Last year, Sociologist Dr. Mark Regnerus published a large-sample study which demonstrated that children flourish optimally when raised in the traditional family structure of a biological mother and father. This finding itself was not new, as the Child Trend report in 2002 described the very same thing.
As discussed in my previous essay, the new Massachusetts’ statutes will create increased distress and challenges for the gender-confused child and his or her family; the consequences, unfortunately, will not stop there. In fact, the Board’s presumption that the claiming of different gendered status by a child’s peer has a positive (or even neutral) effect on the others in the school—already being challenged by some parents and at least one council member—is naïve, at best.